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ABSTRACT
Deep learning based visual sensing has achieved aractive accuracy
but is shown vulnerable to adversarial example aacks. Speci-
cally, once the aackers obtain the deep model, they can construct
adversarial examples to mislead the model to yield wrong classi-
cation results. Deployable adversarial examples such as small
stickers pasted on the road signs and lanes have been shown ef-
fective in misleading advanced driver-assistance systems. Many
existing countermeasures against adversarial examples build their
security on the aackers’ ignorance of the defense mechanisms.
us, they fall short of following Kerckhos’s principle and can be
subverted once the aackers know the details of the defense. is
paper applies the strategy of moving target defense (MTD) to gener-
ate multiple new deep models aer system deployment, that will
collaboratively detect and thwart adversarial examples. Our MTD
design is based on the adversarial examples’ minor transferability
to models diering from the one (e.g., the factory-designed model)
used for aack construction. e post-deployment quasi-secret
deep models signicantly increase the bar for the aackers to con-
struct eective adversarial examples. We also apply the technique
of serial data fusion with early stopping to reduce the inference time
by a factor of up to 5 while maintaining the sensing and defense per-
formance. Extensive evaluation based on three datasets including a
road sign image database and a GPU-equipped Jetson embedded
computing board shows the eectiveness of our approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
To implement autonomous systems operating in complex environ-
ments (e.g., the long envisaged self-driving cars), the accurate and
resilient perception of the environment is oen the most challeng-
ing step in the closed loop of sensing, decision, and actuation. e
recent advances of deep learning [31, 37] have triggered great inter-
ests of applying it to address the environment perception challenges.
For instance, deep learning-based computer vision techniques have
been increasingly adopted on commercial o-the-shelf advanced
driver-assistance systems (ADAS) [29, 36].
However, recent studies show that deep models (e.g., multilayer
perceptrons and convolutional neural networks) are vulnerable to
adversarial examples, which are inputs formed by applying small
but craed perturbations to the clean examples in order to make
the victim deep model yield wrong classication results. is vul-
nerability is aributed to the linear nature of the deep models [24].
Systematic approaches have been developed to generate adversarial
examples as long as the aackers acquire the deep model, where
the aackers may know the internals of the model [24] or not [50].
Certain constraints can be considered in the generation process
when the aackers cannot tamper with every pixel of the input. For
example, in [21], an algorithm is developed to determine adversarial
stickers that can be implemented by physically pasting small paper
stickers on road signs to mislead vision-based sign classier. More-
over, as demonstrated in [64] and explained in [63], the vision-based
lane detector of Tesla Autopilot, which is an ADAS, can be fooled
by small adversarial stickers on the road and thus direct the car
to the opposite lane, creating life-threatening danger. Autopilot’s
weather condition classier is also shown vulnerable to adversarial
examples, leading to wrong operations of the windshield wiper.
erefore, adversarial examples present an immediate and real
threat to deep visual sensing systems. e design of these systems
must incorporate eective countermeasures especially under the
safety-critical seings.
Existing countermeasures aim at hardening the deep models
through adversarial training [24, 33, 43], adding a data transforma-
tion layer [6, 14, 15, 19, 26, 42, 68, 71, 73], and gradient masking
[9, 52, 55, 59]. ese countermeasures are oen designed to ad-
dress certain adversarial examples and build their security on the
aackers’ ignorance of the defense mechanisms, e.g., the adver-
sarial example generation algorithms used in adversarial training,
the data transformation algorithms, and the gradient masking ap-
proaches. us, they do not address adaptive aackers and fall short
of following Kerckhos’s principle in designing secure systems (i.e.,
the enemy knows the system except for the secret key [58]). Once
the aackers acquire the hardened model and the details of the
defense mechanisms, they can cra the next-generation adversarial
examples to render the hardened model vulnerable again [3, 10].
At present, the deep model training still requires considerable
expertise and extensive ne-tuning. As such, in the current practice,
a factory-designed deep model is oen massively deployed to the
products and remains static until the next soware upgrade. Such
a deployment manner grants the aackers advantage of time. ey
can extract the deep model (which may be much hardened by the
existing countermeasures) from the soware release or the memory
of a purchased product, study it, and construct the next-generation
adversarial examples to aect all products using the same deep
model.
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Beyond the static defense, in this paper, we consider a moving
target defense (MTD) strategy [32] to generate one or more new
deep models aer system deployment that the aackers can hardly
acquire. Dierent from the identical and static deep model that
results in a single point of failure, the generated post-deployment
models are distinct across the systems. is approach invalidates
an essential basis for the aackers to construct eective adversarial
examples, i.e., the acquisition of the deep model. Taking the deep
visual sensing of ADAS as an example, under the MTD strategy,
new deep models can be continually trained when the computing
unit of a car is idle. Once the training completes with the validation
accuracy meeting the manufacturer-specied requirement, the new
deep models can be commissioned to replace the in-service models
that were previously generated on the car. By bootstrapping the
in situ training with randomness, it will be practically dicult for
the aackers to acquire the in-service deep models, which thus can
be viewed as the secret of the system. With MTD, the adversarial
examples constructed based on a stolen deep model are neither
eective across many systems nor eective against a single victim
system over a long period of time. In particular, extracting the
private deep models from a victim system will require physical
access. If the aackers have such physical access, they should
launch the more direct and devastating physical aacks that are
out of the scope of this paper.
In this paper, we design an MTD approach for embedded deep
visual sensing systems that are susceptible to adversarial examples,
such as ADAS [7, 20] and biometric authentication [27]. Several
challenges need to be addressed. First, adversarial examples have
non-negligible transferability to new deep models [24, 40, 49, 62].
From our extensive evaluation based on several datasets, although
a new deep model can largely thwart the adversarial examples
constructed based on a static base model, the adversarial examples
can still mislead the new deep models with a probability from 7%
to 17%. Second, the primitive MTD design of using a single new
deep model does not give awareness of the presence of adversarial
examples, thus losing the opportunities of involving the human
to improve the safety of the system. Note that human can be
considered immune to adversarial examples due to their design
principle of perturbation minimization. ird, in situ training of
the new deep models without resorting to the cloud is desirable
given the concerns of eavesdropping and tampering during the
communications over the Internet. However, the training may incur
signicant computational overhead for the embedded systems.
To collectively address the above challenges, we propose a fork
MTD (fMTD) approach based on three key observations on the re-
sponses of new deepmodels to the adversarial examples constructed
using the base model. First, the output of a new deep model that
is successfully misled by an adversarial example tends to be un-
predictable, even though the adversarial example is constructed
toward a target label [40]. Second, from the minor transferability
of adversarial examples and the unpredictability of the misled new
model’s output, if we use suciently many distinct new models
to classify an adversarial example, a majority of them will give
the correct classication result while the inconsistency of all the
models’ outputs (due to the unpredictability) signals the presence
of aack. is multi-model design echos ensemble machine learn-
ing [16]. ird, compared with training a new deep model from
scratch, the training with a perturbed version of the base model
as the starting point can converge up to 4x faster, imposing less
computation burden.
Based on the above observations, we design the fMTD approach
as follows. When the system has idle computing resources, it adds
independent perturbations to the parameters of the base model
to generate multiple fork models. e base model can be a well
factory-designed deep model that gives certied accuracy for clean
examples, but may be acquired by the aackers. Each fork model is
then used as the starting point of a retraining process. e retrained
fork models are then commissioned for the visual sensing task. As
the fork models are retrained from the base model, intuitively,
they will inherit much of the classication capability of the base
model for clean examples. At run time, an input, which may be an
adversarial example constructed based on the base model, is fed
into each fork model. If the degree of inconsistency among the fork
models’ outputs exceeds a predened level, the input is detected as
an adversarial example. e majority of the fork models’ outputs is
yielded as the nal result of the sensing task. If the system operates
in the human-in-the-loop mode, the human will be requested to
classify detected adversarial examples.
e run-time inference overhead of fMTD is proportional to
the number of fork models used. Based on our performance pro-
ling on NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier, which is a GPU-equipped
embedded computing board, instructing TensorFlow to execute the
fork models at the same time brings limited benet in shortening
inference time. In contrast, the serial execution of them admits an
early stopping mechanism inspired by the serial signal detection
[53]. Specically, the system runs the fork models in serial and
terminates the execution once sucient condence is accumulated
to decide the cleanness of the input. Evaluation results show that
the serial fMTD reduces the inference time by a factor of up to
5 while achieving the similar sensing and defense performance
compared with instructing TensorFlow to execute all fork models.
e contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Based on important observations on the responses of deep
models to adversarial examples, we design fMTD to coun-
teract adversarial example aacks as an ongoing concern.
• We conduct extensive evaluation on fMTD’s accuracy in
classifying clean examples as well as its performance in
detecting and thwarting adversarial examples under a wide
range of seings. e results provide key guidelines for
adopters of fMTD in specic applications.
• We show that the serial execution of the fork models with
early stopping can signicantly reduce the inference time
of fMTD while maintaining the sensing accuracy in both
the absence and presence of aacks.
e reminder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 reviews
background and related work. §3 presents a measurement study
to motivate the fMTD design. §4 designs fMTD. §5 evaluates the
accuracy and aack detection performance of fMTD. §6 proles
fMTD on Jetson and evaluates the serial fMTD. §7 discusses several
issues not addressed in this paper. §8 concludes this paper.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Adversarial Examples and Construction
Adversarial examples are intentionally designed inputs to mislead
deep models to produce incorrect results. Let fθ (x) denote a clas-
sier, where θ is the classier’s parameter and x ∈ [0, 1]m is the
input (e.g., an image). Let y denote the ground truth label of x. e
x′ = x + δ ∈ [0, 1]m is an adversarial example, if fθ (x′) , y. e δ
is the perturbation designed by the aackers. A targeted adversarial
example x′ makes fθ (x′) = yt , where yt , y is a specied target
label. A non-targeted adversarial example ensures that the classi-
cation result fθ (x′) is an arbitrary label other than the ground
truth label y. If the aackers need no knowledge of the classier’s
internals (e.g., architecture, hyperparameters, and parameters) to
construct the adversarial example, the aack is called black-box
aack. Otherwise, it is called white-box aack. In this work, we
consider both targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples. As
the objective of this paper is to develop a defense approach, it is
benecial to consider the stronger white-box aack, in which the
aackers have the knowledge of the internals of the base model.
To increase the stealthiness of the aack to human perception,
the dierence between x and x′, denoted by D(x, x′), is to be min-
imized. us, the construction of the perturbation for a targeted
adversarial example, denoted by δ∗yt , can be formulated as a con-
strained optimization problem [62]: δ∗yt = argminδ D(x, x′), sub-
ject to fθ (x′) = yt and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m . e targeted adversarial
example that gives the minimum D(x, x′) can be yielded as a non-
targeted adversarial example.
Various gradient-based approaches have been proposed to solve
the above constrained optimization problem [4, 12, 13, 24, 35, 45,
46, 51, 56, 61, 62]. Among them, the approach proposed by Carlini
and Wagner (C&W) [12] is oen thought to be a highly eective
aack construction method and used to evaluate various defense
approaches [1]. We briey introduce it here. C&W’s approach
instantiates the distance to be `p -norm and apply Lagrangian relax-
ation to simplify the problem as: δ∗yt = argminδ ‖δ ‖p + c · д(x′),
subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m , where the regularization function д(·) en-
compasses the deep model fθ (·) and satises д(x′) ≥ 0 if and only
if fθ (x′) = yt . e empirical study in [12] shows that the follow-
ing regularization leads to the most eective aacks in general:
д(x′) = max {maxyi,yt {Z (x′)yi } − Z (x′)yt ,−κ}, where Z (·) rep-
resents somax and κ is a parameter controlling the strength of
the constructed adversarial example. at is, with a larger κ, the
x′ is more likely classied as yt . However, the perturbation (or
distortion) δ will be larger. In the inner loop of C&W’s aack con-
struction algorithm for a certain weight c , gradient descent is used
to solve the constrained optimization problem. us, since C&W’s
approach exploits the gradients of fθ (·), it is a gradient-based ap-
proach. In the outer loop of the algorithm, binary search is applied
to nd a seing for c that further minimizes the objective func-
tion. In this paper, we use C&W’s approach to generate adversarial
examples and evaluate our fMTD design. Note that the design of
fMTD does not rely on any specics of the C&W’s approach.
2.2 Countermeasures to Adversarial Examples
Overed models are oen thought highly vulnerable to adversar-
ial example aacks. However, regularization approaches for pre-
venting overing, such as dropout and weight decay, are shown
ineective in precluding adversarial examples [24, 62]. Brute-force
adversarial training [24, 33, 43] can improve a deep model to be
immune to predened adversarial examples. However, it can be
defeated by the adversarial examples that are not considered dur-
ing the adversarial training. A range of other defense approaches
apply various transformations to the input during both the training
and inference phases. e transformations include compression
[6, 14, 15, 19, 26], cropping and foveation [26, 42], data randomiza-
tion [71], and data augmentation [73]. ese approaches oen lead
to accuracy drops on clean examples [72] and are only eective
against the adversarial examples constructed based on the deep
model but without the knowledge of the transformation. Gradient
masking is another category of defense against the adversarial ex-
amples constructed using gradient-based methods [9, 52, 55, 59].
It aempts to deny adversary access to useful gradients for con-
structing aack. However, as shown in [3], if the aackers know
the details of the transformation or the gradient masking, they can
still construct eective adversarial examples to ght back. Provable
defense [18, 54, 70] gives lower bounds of the defense robustness.
However, a key limitation of provable defense is that the lower
bound is applicable for a set of specic adversarial examples only.
As pointed out by [10], a main drawback of most existing aack
prevention and thwarting approaches against adversarial examples
is that they do not consider adaptive aackers. Once the aackers
acquire the details of the defense, the aackers can bypass the de-
fense. In other words, these approaches’ eectiveness is contingent
on the aacker’s ignorance of the defense mechanism.
In addition to aack prevention and thwarting, adversarial ex-
ample detection has also received research. For example, a second
classier can be built to classify an input as clean or adversarial
[23, 41, 44]. Statistical properties of the inputs such principle com-
ponent have been used to detect aacks [5, 30, 39]. Others resort
to statistical testing [22, 25]. However, these approaches cannot
detect cray aacks such as the C&W’s aack [11].
2.3 Moving Target Defense
Static defense grants aackers the advantage of time. MTD is an
emerging approach to address this issue and increase the barrier
for eective aacks [32]. For instance, the computer hosts can
mutate their IP addresses such that the aack trac is directed
to wrong destinations [2]. In the approach described in [57], a
deep model is randomly selected from a set of candidate models
each time to classify an input. e approach uses a limited number
of candidate models (e.g., 3 to 6 [57]) and assumes that they are
known to the aackers. Its eectiveness of thwarting the aacks
is merely based on the aackers’ ignorance of which model is
being used, thus following a weak form of MTD. Given the limited
number of candidate models, it is not impossible for the aackers
to construct an adversarial example that can mislead all candidate
models. Moreover, the approach [57] is short of aack detection
capability since a single model is used each time. In contrast, fMTD
applies an ensemble of locally generated deep models that can
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Table 1: Architectures of the CNNs.
Layers CNN-A CNN-B
Convolutional + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Convolutional + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Max pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Convolutional + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64 3 × 3 × 128
Convolutional + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64 3 × 3 × 128
Max pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Fully connected + ReLU 200 256
Fully connected + ReLU 200 256
Somax 10 10 or 43
3 × 3 × 32 means 32 3 × 3 convolutional lters.
Table 2: Training hyperparameters of the CNNs.
Hyperparameters CNN-A CNN-B
Learning rate 0.1 0.01 (decay 0.5)
Momentum rate 0.9 0.9 (decay 0.5)
Decay delay - 10 epochs
Dropout rate 0.5 0.5
Batch size 128 128
Epochs 50 50
proliferate within the system’s available computation resources
to achieve both aack detection and thwarting capabilities, thus
constituting a strong form of MTD.
3 MEASUREMENT STUDY
We conduct measurements to gain insights for MTD design.
3.1 Used Datasets and Deep Models
We rst introduce the datasets and the deep models used in this
measurement study as well as the extensive performance evaluation
for fMTD in §5. We use the following three datasets:
• MNIST [38] is a dataset consisting of 60,000 training sam-
ples and 10,000 test samples. Each sample is a 28 × 28
grayscale image showing a handwrien digit from 0 to 9.
We select 5,000 training samples as the validation dataset.
• CIFAR-10 [34] is a 10-class dataset consisting of 50,000
training samples and 10,000 test samples. Each sample is a
32× 32 RGB color image. e 10 classes are airplanes, cars,
birds, cats, deers, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. We
select 5,000 training samples as the validation dataset.
• GTSRB [60] (GermanTrac Sign Recognition Benchmark)
is a 43-class dataset with more than 50,000 images sizing
from 15×15 to 250×250 pixels. For convenience, we resize
all the images to 32 × 32 pixels by interpolation or down-
sampling. We divide them into training, validation, and test
datasets with 34799, 4410, and 12630 samples, respectively.
We adopt two convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures
that have been used in [12] and [52]. Table 1 illustrates the two
architectures that are referred to as CNN-A and CNN-B; Table 2
shows the training hyperparameters. We apply CNN-A to MNIST.
CNN-A has two convolutional layers with 32 3 × 3 lters followed
by a max pooling layer, two convolutional layers with 64 3×3 lters
followed by a max pooling layer, two fully connected layers with
200 rectied linear units (ReLUs) each, and a 10-class somax layer.
CNN-A is trained on MNIST using the momentum-based stochastic
gradient descent. CNN-A achieves training and validation accuracy
of 99.84% and 99.44%, respectively.
We apply CNN-B to CIFAR-10 and GTSRB. CNN-B’s main dif-
ference from CNN-A is that more convolutional lters and more
ReLUs in the fully connected layers are used to address the more
complex paerns of the CIFAR-10 and GTSRB images. Its somax
layer has 10 or 43 classes for CIFAR-10 and GTSRB, respectively.
CNN-B is trained with a learning rate of 0.01 (decay of 0.5 every 10
epochs) and a momentum rate of 0.9 (decay of 0.5 every 10 epochs).
For CIFAR-10, CNN-B achieves a validation accuracy of 79.62%.
is result is consistent with those obtained in [12] and [52]. For
GTSRB, CNN-B achieves training and validation accuracy of 99.93%
and 96.64%, respectively.
e MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets have been widely used in
image recognition and machine learning research. e use of these
two datasets allows us to adopt the CNN architectures that have
been shown suitable for them. From the achieved training and
validation accuracy, MNIST and CIFAR-10 are representatives of
data with simple and complex paerns, respectively. GTSRB gives
realism since road sign recognition must be part of ADAS’s visual
sensing. However, this study does not cater to any specic applica-
tion. While the detailed results (e.g., classication accuracy) may
dier across datasets, we will draw common observations from the
results obtained based on these three datasets. e observations
will provide useful guidance for the adopters of fMTD to validate
their customized fMTD designs in specic applications.
3.2 Measurement Results
In this section, we conduct measurements to investigate the re-
sponses of multiple new models to adversarial examples constructed
based on the base model that is dierent from the new models.
3.2.1 Adversarial examples. We use the seings described in
§3.1 to train a base model for each dataset. en, we use the C&W
approach described in §2.1 to generate adversarial examples based
on the base model. Specically, for each dataset, we select a clean
test sample in each class as the basis for constructing the targeted ad-
versarial examples whose targeted labels are the remaining classes.
For instance, as MNIST has 10 classes, a total of 10×9 = 90 targeted
adversarial examples will be generated. To generate non-targeted
adversarial examples for each dataset, we randomly select 100 test
samples as the bases for the construction by following the proce-
dure described in §2.1. e C&W’s adversarial examples are highly
eective – all adversarial examples that we generate are eective
against the base model.
As described in §2.1, the κ is an important parameter of the
C&W’s approach that controls the trade-o between the eective-
ness of the aack and the distortion introduced. We vary κ from
0 to 95. e rst image column of Table 3 shows three clean ex-
amples from MNIST. e rest image columns show a number of
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Table 3: Targeted adversarial examples constructed using
C&W approach [12] with `2-norm and various κ settings.
Clean Aack’s target label
example 2 3 2 3 2 3
Gr
ou
nd
tru
th
la
be
l 0
1
2
κ = 0 κ = 45 κ = 95
Table 4: Attack success
rate (ASR)
MNIST 6.72%
CIFAR-10 17.3%
GTSRB 7.17%
∗ κ = 0.
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Fig. 1: ASR vs. distortion.
targeted adversarial examples constructed with three seings of
κ. For instance, all images in the second column will be wrongly
classied by the base model as ‘2’. We can see that with κ = 0, the
perturbations introduced by the aack are almost imperceptible to
human eyes without referring to the clean examples. With κ = 45,
there are clear distortions. With κ = 95, the perturbations may
completely erase the gure shapes or create random shapes.
In the rest of this paper, for the sake of aack stealthiness to
human, we adopt κ = 0 unless otherwise specied. To conrm the
eectiveness of the adversarial examples with κ = 0, we conduct
an extended experiment with 1,000 targeted adversarial examples
of κ = 0 for MNIST (900 of them are based on `2-norm, whereas
the remaining are based on `0- and `∞-norm due to the slowness
in generation). All these 1,000 adversarial examples are eective
against the base model.
3.2.2 Transferability of adversarial examples. In this set of mea-
surements, for each dataset, we train a newmodel that has the same
architecture as the base model. en, we measure the aack suc-
cess rate (ASR) of the adversarial examples on the new model. An
adversarial example is successful if the deep model yields a wrong
label. e ASR characterizes the transferability of the adversarial
examples to a model diering from the one used for their construc-
tion. Table 4 shows the ASR for the three datasets. We can see
that the adversarial examples constructed using the base model can
still mislead the new model with probabilities from 7% to 17%. is
suggests that the adversarial examples have some transferability
across dierent deep models with the same architecture.
We also evaluate the transferability of the adversarial examples
constructed with dierent κ seings. We use the Euclidean distance
between the adversarial example x′ and its corresponding clean
example x to characterize the distortion caused by the adversarial
perturbation. A larger κ will result in a larger distortion and thus
less stealthiness of the aack to human. Fig. 1 shows the ASR
versus distortion for CIFAR-10. We can see that the ASR increases
0
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ob
ab
ili
ty
The number of distinct outputs
Fig. 2: Distribution of the
number of distinct outputs
of 20 new models given an
adversarial example built us-
ing the base model.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of the 20
new models’ outputs given
an adversarial example with
ground truth label of 1 and
attack target label of 0.
with the distortion. is shows the trade-o between the aack’s
transferability and stealthiness to human.
3.2.3 Outputs of multiple new models. From §3.2.2, adversarial
examples have non-negligible transferability to a new model. us,
using a single new model may not thwart adversarial example at-
tacks. In this set of measurements, we study the outputs of multiple
new models. With the base model for each of the three datasets,
we construct 270 targeted adversarial examples (i.e., 90 examples
based on each of the `0, `2, and `∞ norms) and 300 non-targeted
adversarial examples (i.e., 100 examples based on each of the three
norms). For each of the three datasets, we independently train 20
new models. We denote by D the number of distinct outputs of the
20 models given an adversarial example. Fig. 2 shows the histogram
of D. From the gure, the probability that D is greater than one is
51%. is means that, by simply checking the consistency of the
20 models’ outputs, we can detect half of the adversarial example
aacks. e probability that D = 1 (i.e., all 20 new models give the
same output) is 49%. Moreover, 99.5% of the adversarial examples
that result in D = 1 fail to mislead any new model. is result sug-
gests that, even if an adversarial example aack cannot be detected
by checking the consistency of the 20 models’ outputs, it will be
thwarted automatically with a high probability.
We now use an example to illustrate whether an adversarial
example resulting in D > 1 can be thwarted. Fig. 3 shows the
histogram of the 20 new models’ outputs given a targeted CIFAR-10
adversarial example with a ground truth label of 1 and a target label
of 0. We can see that most new models yield the ground truth label
and only a few models yield labels rather than the aack’s target
label. is shows that the wrong outputs of the new models tend
to be unpredictable, rather than the aack’s target label. It also
suggests that a voting from the distinct outputs of the new models
based on a majority rule can thwart the aack.
3.2.4 Retraining perturbed base model. e results in §3.2.3 sug-
gest that an ensemble of multiple new models is promising for
detecting and thwarting adversarial example aacks. However,
the training of the new models may incur signicant computation
overhead. In this section, we investigate a retraining approach.
Specically, we add perturbations to the well trained base model
and use the result as the starting point of a retraining process to
generate a new model. e model perturbation is as follows. For
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Table 5: e number of epochs for new model retraining.
Intensity of Dataset
perturbation (w) MNIST CIFAR-10 GTSRB
0.1 11 11 12
0.2 12 13 13
0.3 13 18 13
training from scratch 23 44 22
each parameter matrix M of the base model, we add an indepen-
dent perturbation to each element inM. e perturbation is drawn
randomly and uniformly from [w · min(M),w · max(M)], where
min(M) and max(M) represent the smallest and largest elements of
M, respectively, and w controls the intensity of the perturbation.
e system stops the retraining process if the validation accuracy
stops increasing for ve consecutive epochs. en, the model in
the retraining epoch that gives the highest validation accuracy is
yielded as a new model. Table 5 shows the number of epochs for
retraining a new model versus the intensity of the perturbation. We
can see that the number of epochs increases with the perturbation
intensity. As a comparison, when a new model is trained from
scratch with the same stopping criterion, the number of epochs can
be up to 4x higher than that withw = 0.1.
We also measure the time for retraining 20 new models for GT-
SRB from perturbed versions of the base model on the NVIDIA
Jetson computing board. It takes about 45 minutes.
4 DESIGN OF FMTD
emeasurement results in §3 suggest anMTD design to counteract
adversarial examples. In brief, multiple forkmodels can be generated
dynamically by retraining independently perturbed versions of the
base model. A consistency check on the fork models’ outputs can
detect whether the input is an adversarial example; the majority
of their outputs can be yielded as the nal classication result to
thwart the adversarial example aack if present.
In this section, we will formally present the system and threat
models (§4.1), the design of fMTD that operates autonomously
or admits human’s input on the detection of an aack (§4.2), and
the metrics characterizing the performance of fMTD (§4.3). e
designed fMTD approaches will be extensively evaluated in §5 in
terms of these performance metrics.
4.1 System andreat Models
Consider an embedded visual sensing system (“the system” for
short), which can execute the inference and the training of the used
deep model. In this paper, we focus on a single image classica-
tion task. Image classication is a basic building block of many
visual sensing systems. e classication results can be used to
direct the system’s actuation. We assume that the system has a
well factory-designed model that gives certied accuracy on clean
examples and specied adversarial examples. e system also has a
training dataset that can be used to train a new deep model locally
that achieves a satisfactory classication accuracy as that given by
the factory model. Moreover, we make the following two notes re-
garding the connection of this paper’s focus of image classication
with the overall visual sensing system in real-world applications.
First, the input to the image classier may be a cropped area of
the original image captured by a camera that contains the object of
interest (e.g., the road sign). e cropping can be achieved based
on object detection and image segmentation that have received
extensive study in computer vision literature [48]. In this paper,
we focus on addressing the adversarial example aacks on the
classication task that takes the cropped image as the input. We
assume that the object detection and image segmentation work
normally. If adversarial example aacks against object detection
and image segmentation exist, a separate study will be needed.
Second, some visual sensing systems process a stream of image
frames by classifying the individual frames independently and then
fusing the classication results over time to yield a nal result
[28, 66]. In this paper, we focus on the classication of a single
image. e aack-proof classication of individual frames will
ensure the robustness of the temporal fusion of the classication
results. Some other visual sensing systems may take a sequence of
image frames as a one-shot input to the deep model [8, 17]. Our
MTD approach is also applicable in this seing, since its design
does not require specic structure of the deep model’s input.
We assume that the aackers cannot corrupt the system. Given
that the factory model is static, we assume that the aackers can
acquire it via memory extraction, data exltration aack, or insid-
ers (e.g., unsatised or socially engineered employees). We also
assume that the aackers can acquire the training dataset on the
system, since the dataset is also a static factory seing. We assume
that the aackers can construct stealthy targeted or non-targeted
adversarial examples with a white-box approach (e.g., the C&W ap-
proach [12]) based on the factory model or any deep model trained
by the aackers using the dataset. Since the focus of this paper
is to develop a defense approach, it is benecial to conservatively
consider strong aackers who can launch white-box aacks. is
well conforms to Kerckhos’s principle.
We assume that the system can generate random numbers locally
at run time that cannot be acquired by the aackers, although the
aackers can know the probabilistic distributions of these random
numbers. Truly random number generation can be costly and di-
cult. Various secure pseudo-random number generation methods
can be used instead to achieve practical condentiality from the
aackers. e pseudo-random numbers will be used to perturb the
base model and generate fork models. As such, the aackers cannot
acquire the exact fork models.
Finally, we assume that the aackers can deploy the adversarial
examples, e.g., to paste adversarial paper stickers on road signs.
4.2 fMTDWork Flow
Fig. 4 overviews the work ow of fMTD. We consider two operating
modes of fMTD: autonomous and human-in-the-loop. Both modes
have the following three components.
4.2.1 Fork models generation. To “move the target”, the system
generates new deep models locally for the image classication task.
Specically, we adopt the approach described in §3.2.4 to perturb
the base model with a specied intensity level w and retrain the
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Fig. 4: Workow of fMTD. In the autonomousmode, the at-
tack thwarting module is executed regardless of the attack
detection result. In the human-in-the-loopmode, the attack
thwarting module is executed only when the attack detec-
tion gives a positive detection result.
perturbed model using the training data to generate a fork model.
e retraining completes when the validation accuracy meets a
certain criterion. Using the above procedure, a total of N fork
models are generated independently. We now discuss several issues.
From our evaluation results in §5, a larger seing of N in gen-
eral leads to beer performance in counteracting the adversarial
example aack. erefore, the largest seing subject to the com-
putation resource constraints and run-time inference timeliness
requirements can be adopted. In §6, we will investigate the run-time
overhead of the fork models.
e fork models generation can be performed right aer receiv-
ing each new release of the factory-designed model from the system
manufacturer. For example, as measured in §3.2.4, generating 20
fork models for road sign recognition requires 45 minutes only. To
further improve the system’s security, the fork models generation
can also be performed periodically or continuously whenever the
computing unit of the system is idle. For instance, an electric car
can perform the generation when it is charging during nights. A
newly generated fork model can replace the oldest one among the
N fork models.
Since the fork model is retrained from a perturbed version of
the base model, the fork model may converge to the base model.
However, as the stochastic gradient descent used in the training
also incorporates randomness and a deep model oen has a large
degree of freedom, with a sucient perturbation intensity levelw ,
the fork model is most unlikely identical to the base model. From a
rigorous perspective of information security, the aackers still have
a certain amount of information about the fork model since they
have the base model and can know the perturbation and retraining
mechanisms. us, the ensemble of the fork models should be
viewed as a quasi-secret of the system only. Nevertheless, MTD
is not meant for perfect security, but for signicantly increased
barriers for the aackers to launch eective aacks.
4.2.2 Aack detection. An input is sent to all fork models for
classication. From the observations in §3.2.3, we can check the
consistency of the outputs of all the fork models to detect whether
the input is an adversarial example. If more than T × 100% of the
outputs are the same, the input is detected as a clean example;
otherwise, it is detected as an adversarial example. Noted that T is
a threshold that can be congured to achieve various satisfactory
trade-os. We will evaluate the impact of T on the performance of
the system and discuss its seing in §5.
4.2.3 Aack thwarting. Aack thwarting aims to give the ground
truth label of an adversarial example. From the observations in
§3.2.3, we apply the majority rule to thwart the adversarial exam-
ple aack. Specically, the most frequent label among the N fork
models’ outputs is yielded as the nal result.
In the autonomous mode, regardless of the aack detection re-
sult, the system will execute the aack thwarting component to
generate the nal result for the autonomous actuation of the system.
Dierently, in the human-in-the-loop mode, upon a detection of
adversarial example, the system will ask the human operator to
classify the input and use the result for the system’s subsequent
actuation; if no aack is detected, the system will execute the aack
thwarting component to yield the nal classication result for the
subsequent actuation. In this paper, we assume that the human
operator will not make any classication error. With this assump-
tion, our performance metrics analysis (§4.3) and evaluation (§5)
will provide essential understanding on how the human operator’s
involvement owing to fMTD’s aack detection capability improves
the system’s safety in the presence of aacks. Moreover, since the
construction of the adversarial examples follows the perturbation
minimization principle to remain imperceptible to human eyes, it is
also reasonable to assume that the human operator will not make
aack-induced classication error. Nevertheless, our performance
metric analysis and evaluation can be easily extended to address
human operator’s certain error rates when they are non-negligible.
We study both the autonomous and human-in-the-loop modes
to understand how the involvement of human aects the system’s
performance in the absence and presence of adversarial example
aacks. Fully autonomous safety-critical systems in complex en-
vironments (e.g., self-driving cars) are still grand challenges. For
example, all existing o-the-shelf ADAS still requires the driver’s
supervision throughput the driving process. In this paper, we use
the results of the autonomous mode as a baseline. For either the au-
tonomous or the human-in-the-loop modes, eective countermea-
sures against adversarial examples must be developed and deployed
to achieve trustworthy systems with advancing autonomy.
4.3 Performance Metrics
In this section, we analyze the metrics for characterizing the perfor-
mance of fMTD in the autonomous and human-in-the-loop modes.
Fig. 5 illustrates the categorization of the system’s detection and
thwarting results. In the following, we use x to refer to a block
numbered by x in Fig. 5. In §5, we use px to denote the probabil-
ity of the event described by the block conditioned on the event
described by the precedent block. We will illustrate px shortly.
When the ground truth of the input is an adversarial example,
it may be detected correctly 1 or missed 2 . us, we use p1 and
p2 to denote the true positive and false negative rates in aack
detection. We now further discuss the two cases of true positive
and false negative:
• In case of 1 , the autonomous fMTD may succeed 3 or
fail 4 in thwarting the aack; dierently, the human-in-
the loop fMTD can always thwart the aack 3 . Note that
when the aack thwarting is successful, the system will
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Fig. 5: Categorization of the system’s attack detection and
thwarting results and the evaluation metrics. e shaded
blocks of “Failed thwarting” and “Wrong output” are not ap-
plicable to human-in-the-loop fMTD.
yield the correct classication result; otherwise, the system
will yield a wrong classication result.
• In case of 2 , the autonomous or human-in-the-loop fMTD
may succeed 5 or fail 6 in thwarting the aack.
e successful defense rate 13 is the sum of the probabilities for 3
and 5 . e aack success rate 14 is the sum of the probabilities
for 4 and 6 . Note that, with the autonomous fMTD, the two
rates are independent of fMTD’s detection performance, because
the aack thwarting component is always executed regardless of
the detection result. In contrast, with the human-in-the-loop fMTD,
the two rates depend on fMTD’s aack detection performance. In
§5, we will evaluate the impact of the aack detection performance
on the two rates.
When the ground truth of the input is a clean example, the
detector may generate a false positive 7 or a true negative 8 .
• In case of 7 , the aack thwarting of the autonomous
fMTD may yield a correct 9 or wrong 10 classication
result; dierently, the human-in-the-loop fMTD can always
give the correct classication result.
• In case of 8 , the aack thwarting of the autonomous or
human-in-the-loop fMTDmay yield a correct 11 or wrong
12 classication result.
e accuracy of the system in the absence of aack 15 is the sum
of the probabilities for 9 and 11 .
For fMTD, the successful defense rate p13 and the accuracy p15
are the main metrics that characterize the system’s performance in
the presence and absence of aacks. In the autonomous mode, these
two metrics are independent of the aack detection performance.
Dierently, in the human-in-the-loop mode, they are aected by
the aack detection performance. In an extreme case, if the detector
always gives positive detection results, the human will take over
the classication task every time to give the correct results, causing
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Fig. 6: Targeted adversarial examples constructed using
C&W approach [12] with `2-norm and various κ settings.
Each row consists of adversarial examples generated from
the same clean example.
lots of unnecessary burden to the human in the absence of aack.
is unnecessary burden can be characterized by the false positive
rate p7. ere exists a trade-o between this unnecessary burden
to human and the system’s performance. In summary, the perfor-
mance of the autonomous fMTD and human-in-the-loop fMTD can
be mainly characterized by the tuples of (p13,p15) and (p7,p13,p15),
respectively.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we extensively evaluate fMTD in terms of the per-
formance metrics described in §4.3.
5.1 Evaluation Methodology and Settings
e evaluation is also based on the three datasets described in §3.1.
We adopt the CNN-A and CNN-B in Table 1 and the hyperparame-
ters in Table 2 to train the base models for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
GTSRB. We follow the approach described in §3.2.1 to generate
the adversarial examples. Fig. 6 shows a subset of the adversarial
examples constructed by the C&W approach using the `2-norm for
GTSRB. Note that the images on the diagonal of Fig. 6 are clean
examples. We can see that the adversarial perturbations are imper-
ceptible. e fMTD has three congurable parameters: the number
of fork models N , the model perturbation intensity w , and the
aack detection threshold T . eir default seings are: N = 20,
w = 0.2, and T = 1 (i.e., the aack detector will alarm if there is
any inconsistency among the fork models’ outputs).
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Fig. 7: False positive rate of attack detection (p7).
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Fig. 8: e rate that the attack thwarting module gives cor-
rect output for false positives (p9).
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Fig. 9: e rate that the attack thwarting module gives cor-
rect output for true negatives (p11).
5.2 Results in the Absence of Attack
e deployment of the defense should not downgrade the system’s
sensing accuracy in the absence of aack. is section evaluates
this sensing accuracy. All clean test samples are used to measure
the probabilities in the boom part of Fig. 5.
First, we use all the clean test samples to evaluate the false
positive rate (i.e., p7) of the aack detection. Fig. 7 shows the
measured p7 versus N under variousw seings. e p7 increases
with N . is is because, with more fork models, it will be more
likely that the fork models give inconsistent results. Moreover, p7
increases withw . is is because, with a higher model perturbation
level, the retrained fork models are likely more dierent and thus
give dierent results to trigger the aack detection. e p7 for
CIFAR-10 is more than 20%. Such a high p7 is caused by the high
complexity of the CIFAR-10 images. Moreover, the detector with
T = 1 is very sensitive. With a smaller T , the p7 will reduce. For
instance, with T = 0.6, p7 is around 5%-10%.
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Fig. 10: Accuracy of the system in the absence of attack (p15).
e horizontal lines represent the validation accuracy of the
respective base models.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the rates that the aack thwarting gives
the correct output when the aack detection yields a false positive
and a true negative, respectively. ese two rates are p9 and p11 as
illustrated in Fig. 5. In general, both rates increase with N andw .
is suggests that with more fork models that are more distinct,
the classication performance of the system increases. Another
observation is that, p9 is around 60%, whereas p11 is nearly 100%.
is is because, for the clean examples that have triggered the aack
detector are not well classiable; in contrast, the clean examples that
have induced all the fork models to produce consistent classication
results can be clearly classied.
Fig. 10 shows the accuracy of the system in the absence of aack
(i.e., p15) versus N under various w seings. e curves labeled
“scratch” represent the results obtained based on newmodels trained
from scratch, rather than forkmodels. We can see that training from
scratch brings insignicant (less than 2%) accuracy improvement.
e horizontal lines in Fig. 10 represent the validation accuracy
of the respective base models. We can see that due to the adop-
tion of multiple deep models, the system’s accuracy is improved.
is is consistent with the understanding from the decision fusion
theory [67]. e results also show that larger seings for N bring
insignicant accuracy improvement. Reasons are as follows. First,
for MNIST and GTSRB, as the accuracy of a single fork model is
already high, the decision fusion based on the majority rule cannot
improve the accuracy much. Second, for CIFAR-10, although the
accuracy of a single fork model is not high (about 80%), the high
correlations among the fork models’ outputs impede the eective-
ness of decision fusion. Note that, dierently, larger seings for N
will bring signicant defense performance, which will be shown in
§5.3.
From Fig. 10c, the accuracy of the road sign recognition is around
97%. e original images in GTSRB have varied resolutions. To
facilitate our evaluation, we resized all the images to 32 × 32 pixels.
is low resolution contributes to the 3% error rate. With higher res-
olutions, this error rate can be further reduced. e main purpose
of this evaluation is to show that, in the absence of aacks, fMTD
can retain or slightly improve the system’s accuracy obtained with
the base model. Note that statistical data released by car manufac-
turers show that ADAS helps reduce safety incident rates [65, 69],
implying the high accuracy of ADAS’s visual sensing in the absence
of aacks.
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Fig. 11: Performance of human-in-the-loop fMTD in the ab-
sence of attack. (Dataset: GTSRB)
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Fig. 12: True positive rate of attack detection (p1).
Lastly, we consider the human-in-the-loop fMTD. Fig. 11 shows
the results based on GTSRB. Specically, Fig. 11a shows the false
positive rate p7 versus N under various seings for the detection
threshold T . e p7 decreases with T , since the aack detector
becomes less sensitive with smallerT seings. e p7 characterizes
the overhead incurred to the human who will make the manual
classication when the aack detector raises an alarm. Fig. 11b
shows the accuracy p15 versus N under various T seings. e
curve labeled “auto” is the result for the autonomous fMTD. We
can see that the human-in-the-loop fMTD with T = 1 outperforms
the autonomous fMTD by up to 3% accuracy, bringing the accuracy
close to 100%. From Fig. 11a and Fig. 11b, we can see a trade-o
between the overhead incurred to and the accuracy improvement
brought by the human in the loop. To beer illustrate this trade-o,
Fig. 11c shows the accuracy versus the false positive rate under
various model perturbation intensity seings. Dierent points
on a curve are the results obtained with dierent seings of the
aack detection threshold T . We can clearly see that the accuracy
increases with the false positive rate. In this set of results, the
accuracy improvement is from the human’s perfect accuracy that
we assume. Intuitively, as long as the human’s accuracy is higher
than the autonomous fMTD, involvement of human is benecial.
5.3 Results in the Presence of Attack
We use the targeted adversarial examples to evaluate the perfor-
mance of fMTD in detecting and thwarting aacks. Fig. 12 shows
the true positive rate (i.e., p1) versus N under various seings ofw .
For the three datasets, the p1 increases from around 50% to more
than 90% when N increases from 3 to 20. is shows that, due to
the minor transferability of adversarial examples, increasing the
number of fork models is very eective in improving the aack
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Fig. 13: Rate of successfully thwarting detected attacks (p3).
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Fig. 14: Rate of successfully thwarting missed attacks (p5).
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Fig. 15: Successful defense rate (p13).
detection performance. For GTSRB, whenw = 0.3, all aacks can
be detected as long as N is greater than 3.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the rates of successfully thwarting the
detected aacks (i.e., p3) and the missed aacks (i.e., p5), respec-
tively. In general, these rates increase with N . From the two gures,
fMTD is more eective in thwarting the missed aacks than the
detected aacks. is is because, for a missed aack, all fork models
give the same and correct classication result. However, for the
detected aacks, all fork models’ results are inconsistent and there
is a chance for the majority among the results is a wrong classica-
tion result. From Fig. 13a, MNIST has a relatively low p3. is is
because under the same seing of κ = 0, the MNIST adversarial ex-
amples have larger distortions. e average distortions introduced
by the malicious perturbations, as dened in §3.2.1, are 1.9 and 0.4
for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. us, the strengths of the
malicious perturbations applied on MNIST are higher, leading to
the lower aack thwarting rates in Fig. 13a.
Fig. 15 shows the successful defense rate (i.e., p13) versus N . e
p13 has an increasing trend with N . e curves labeled “scratch”
represent the results obtainedwith newmodels trained from scratch
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Fig. 16: True positive rate and successful defense rate in the
human-in-the-loop mode. (Dataset: GTSRB)
rather than fork models. e fMTD achieves successful defense of
98% with w = 0.3 for CIFAR-10 and w = 0.5 for GTSRB. MNIST
has relatively low success defense rates due to the relatively low
rates of successfully thwarting detected aacks as shown in Fig. 13a.
However, with new models trained from scratch, the success de-
fense rates for MNIST are nearly 100%. e higher success defense
rates achieved by the new models trained from scratch are due to
the lower transferability of adversarial examples to such models.
However, training from scratch will incur higher (up to 4x) com-
putation overhead. us, there is a trade-o between the aack
defense performance and the training computation overhead. We
will further discuss this issue in §7.
Lastly, we evaluate how the human improves the aack thwart-
ing performance when fMTD operates in the human-in-the-loop
mode. Fig. 16 shows the results based on GTSRB. With a larger T
seing (i.e., the detector is more sensitive), the true positive rate
increases, requesting more frequent manual classication by the
human. As a result, the successful defense rate can increase to 100%,
higher than that of the autonomous fMTD. Recalling the results
in Fig. 11a, a larger T leads to higher false positive rates and thus
higher unnecessary overhead incurred to the human. us, there
exists a trade-o between the successful defense rate and the un-
necessary overhead incurred to the human. To beer illustrate this
trade-o, Fig. 16c shows the successful defense rate versus the false
positive rate. Dierent points on a curve are the results obtained
with dierent seings of T . We can clearly see that the successful
defense rate increases with the false positive rate.
5.4 Summary and Implication of Results
From §5.2 and §5.3, we have the following observations.
First, in the absence of aack, autonomous fMTD does not im-
prove the classication accuracy much when the number of fork
models N increases. Dierently, autonomous fMTD’s successful
defense rate can be substantially improved when N increases. Note
that, without fMTD, the adversarial example aacks against the
static base model are always successful. is clearly suggests the
necessity of deploying countermeasures.
Second, there exists a trade-o between the successful defense
rate and the computation overhead in generating the fork models.
Specically, with more fork models retrained from the base model
with larger model perturbation intensity (w), higher successful
defense rates can be achieved. However, the retraining will have
higher computation overhead as shown in Table 5. From the results
in Fig. 15, training the new models from scratch gives near-perfect
defense performance. However, it incurs computation overhead
several times higher than our model forking approach.
ird, the proposed human-in-the-loop design enables the sys-
tem to leverage the human’s immunity to stealthy adversarial exam-
ples. e on-demand involvement of human improves the system’s
accuracy in the absence of aack and the successful defense rate
in the presence of aack, with an overhead incurred to the human
that is characterized by the false positive rate. From Fig. 11c and
Fig. 16c for the GTSRB road sign dataset, with a false positive rate
of 4%, the accuracy without aack is more than 99% and the suc-
cessful defense rate is nearly 100%. e 4% false positive rate means
that, on average, the human will be asked to classify a road sign
every 25 clean images of road signs that are detected by ADAS. As
adversarial example aacks are rare (but critical) events, how to
further reduce the false positive rate while maintaining accuracy
and successful defense rate is interesting for further research.
6 SERIAL FMTDWITH EARLY STOPPING
In this section, we investigate the run-time overhead of an fMTD
implementation on an embedded computing board with hardware
acceleration for deep model execution. As many visual sensing sys-
tems need to meet real-time requirements, we also investigate how
to reduce the run-time overhead of fMTD without compromising
its accuracy and defense performance.
6.1 fMTD Implementation and Proling
6.1.1 Setup. We implement our fMTD approach using Tensor-
Flow and deploy it on an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier [47]. Jet-
son is an embedded computing board launched in December 2018
and designed for running deep neural networks in applications of
automative, manufacturing, retail, and etc. A Jetson board sizes
10.5×10.5 cm2 and weighs 280 grams including its thermal transfer
plate. It is equipped with an octal-core ARM CPU, a 512-core Volta
GPU with 64 Tensor Cores, and 16GB LPDDR4X memory. It runs
the Linux4Tegra operating system (version R32.1). e power con-
sumption of Jetson can be congured to be 10W, 15W, and 30W.
In our experiments, we congure it to run at 30W.
6.1.2 Profiling. We conduct a set of proling experiments to
compare two possible execution modes of fMTD, i.e., parallel and
serial. In most deep learning frameworks, the training and test-
ing samples are fed to the deep model in batches. For instance,
for ADAS, the road signs segmented from a sequence of frames
captured by the camera can form a batch to be fed to the deep
model. Our proling experiments also follow the same batch man-
ner to feed the input samples to the fork models. Specically, in the
parallel mode, a batch of input samples are fed to all fork models
simultaneously and all fork models are executed in parallel. is
is achieved by the parallel models feature of Keras that is a neural
network library running on top of TensorFlow. In the serial mode,
a batch of input samples are fed to each of the fork models in se-
rial, i.e., the next model is not executed until the completion of the
previous one.
We use GTSRB test samples to compare the inference times of
the fMTD in the parallel and serial modes. We vary the seings
of the batch size and the number of models. Under each seing,
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we run fMTD in each mode for 100 times. Fig. 17a shows the per-
sample inference time of fMTD with 20 fork models versus the
batch size. Each error bar under a batch size seing represents the
average, the 5th percentile, and the 95th percentile of the measured
inference times. We can see that the per-sample inference time
decreases with the batch size but becomes at when the batch
size is large. is is because that for a larger batch, TensorFlow
can process more samples concurrently. However, with too large
batch size seings, the concurrency becomes saturated due to the
exhaustion of GPU resources. e per-sample inference time of
the serial fMTD is longer than that of the parallel fMTD. is is
because that Keras will try to use all GPU resources to run as many
as possible forkmodels concurrently. us, the nite GPU resources
will result in a bounded ratio between the inference times of the
parallel and serial modes. Fig. 17b shows this ratio versus the batch
size. We can see that the ratio decreases from 1.45 to 1.25 and
becomes at. Reason of the decrease is, with larger batch sizes,
the parallel mode has less opportunity to really execute the fork
models concurrently. is limited ratio suggests that Jetson’s GPU
resources are still constrained (compared with server platforms).
us, on resource-constrained embedded platforms with certain
hardware acceleration for deep models, the parallel execution of
multiple fork models will not reduce the inference time much.
Fig. 18a shows the per-sample per-model inference time versus
the number of fork models N . For serial fMTD, the per-sample
per-model inference time is independent of N . is result is natural.
Dierently, for parallel fMTD, it decreases with N . Fig. 18b shows
the ratio between the two modes’ inference times versus N , which
increases from about 1 to 1.3. As discussed earlier, because Keras
tries to run as many as possible models concurrently, the fMTD
with more fork models will be more advantageous in per-model
inference time, but will become saturated eventually.
6.2 Serial fMTD with Early Stopping
6.2.1 Design. From the results in §6.1, due to the hardware
resources constraint, the parallel execution of the fork models does
not bring much improvement in terms of inference time. In contrast,
the serial execution mode admits early stopping when there is
sucient condence about the fused result. is is inspired by
the serial decision fusion that can reduce the number of decisions
needed while maintaining the same event detection performance
[53]. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of the serial fusion process
with early stopping. Note that, in Line 1, a subset of three models is
the minimum seing enabling the majority-based decision fusion.
In Line 3, the Ts is a congurable aack detection threshold. We
will assess its impact on the serial fMTD’s performance shortly.
Depending on the operating mode of the system (i.e., autonomous
or human-in-the-loop), the classication result of Algorithm 1 is
sent to actuation subsystems or the human is requested to perform
classication if the input is detected as an adversarial example.
Algorithm 1 Serial fusion with early stopping
Given: set of fork models F , input x
1: randomly select 3 models from F and use them to classify x
2: loop
3: if more than Ts × 100% of the existing classication results
are the same then
4: x is detected clean and break the loop
5: else if all models in F have been selected then
6: x is detected adversarial and break the loop
7: end if
8: from F randomly select a model that has not been selected
before and use it to classify x
9: end loop
10: return (1) aack detection result and (2) the majority of the
existing classication results
6.2.2 Evaluation. In our experiments, we set N = 20 and vary
the serial detection threshold Ts from 0.5 to 1. Fig. 19a shows the
number of folk models used in serial fMTD. For instance, when
Ts ≤ 60% andTs = 100%, only three models are used in 95% and 68%
of all the tests, respectively. When Ts = 50% and Ts = 100%, 3.08
and 8.37 models are used on average, respectively. e inference
times of serial fMTD with Ts = 50% and Ts = 100% are just about
20% and 50% of that of parallel fMTD executing all 20 models.
en, we evaluate the impact of the early stopping on the sensing
and defense performance. Fig. 19b shows the accuracy (p15) versus
the false positive rate (p7). Dierent points on a curve are results
under dierentTs seings from 0.5 to 1. We can see that, compared
with executing all fork models, the early stopping results in lile
accuracy drop (about 0.1%). Fig. 19c shows the successful defense
rate (p13) versus the false positive rate (p7). Dierent points on a
curve are results under dierent Ts seings from 0.5 to 1. We can
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Fig. 19: Performance of human-in-the-loop serial fMTD
with early stopping. (Dataset: GTSRB; “all”means that early
stopping is not enabled; grey line represents median; red
square dot represents mean; box represents the (20%, 80%)
range; upper/lower bar represents maximum/minimum.)
see that, with a false positive rate of 4%, the successful defense rate
drops 2.2% only. e above results show that the early stopping
can signicantly reduce the run-time inference time, with lile
compromise of accuracy and defense performance. e results for
MNIST and CIFAR-10 are similar; we omit them here due to space
constraint.
7 DISCUSSION
e fMTD trains the fork models from perturbed base model. e
results in Fig. 15 show that if the new models are trained from
scratch, near-perfect defense rates can be achieved. In practice, the
factory models can be more sophisticated than the ones used in this
paper. e training from scratch may require massive training data
and long training time for the embedded system. In addition, the
factory models may contain extensive manual tuning by experts.
e fMTD’s approach of training from perturbed versions of the
factory model is more credible to retain the desirable manual tuning.
How to retain specic manually tuned features of the factory model
in the fork models is interesting to future research.
It is also viable for the manufacturer to generate multiple deep
models from the base model for each product independently. If the
models remain static aer the release of the products, this approach
forms a weak form of MTD. e ability of in situ self-updating of
the models is desirable.
8 CONCLUSION
is paper presented a fork moving target defense (fMTD) approach
for deep learning-based image classication on embedded platforms
against the recently discovered adversarial example aacks. We
extensively evaluated the performance of fMTD in the absence
and presence of aacks. Based on the proling results of fMTD on
NVIDIA Jetson, we also proposed a serial fMTDwith early stopping
to reduce the inference time. e results in this paper provide
useful guidelines for integrating fMTD to the current embedded
deep visual sensing systems to improve their security.
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